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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature Of The Case
Andrew Garrett Barry appeals from the district court’s order denying his Rule 35 motion
for reduction of sentence. On appeal, Barry argues the district court abused its discretion both by
denying his attorney’s motion for a third continuance of the Rule 35 hearing and by denying his
Rule 35 motion on its merits.
Statement Of The Facts And Course Of The Proceedings
On June 28, 2015, Barry went to Steven and Christine Francis’ residence to retrieve a dog
that Barry’s wife (from whom Barry was separated) had given to the Francis family. (PSI, pp.3,
18, 43.1) The dog had been living with the Francis family for approximately eight months. (PSI,
p.18.) Barry rang the Francis’ doorbell and, when Steven opened the door, Barry barged in to
the residence, yelling, “‘Give me back my fucking dog.’” (PSI, p.3.) Barry then attacked
Steven, punched him repeatedly in the head and face, and “‘threw [him] around like a rag doll,’”
damaging a wall and several pieces of furniture. (PSI, pp.3, 17.) Barry “took [Steven] to the
ground,” got on top of him, and began strangling Steven, at which time Steven’s 16-year-old son
intervened and attempted to get Barry off of Steven. (PSI, pp.3, 17-18, 26.) Christine “grabbed
a Glock 9mm [in] an attempt to stop” Barry, but she “hesitated to shoot as her son and husband
were too wrapped up with Mr. Barry for a clear shot.” (PSI, p.3.) Barry then focused his
attention on Christine and “started trying to grab the gun from her,” breaking her foot in the
scuffle. (PSI, pp.3, 17, 22.) When Barry was unable to get the gun away from Christine, he
grabbed the dog and threw it out the door, then fled the residence and drove away with the dog.
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(PSI, pp.17-18.) As a result of the attack, Steven suffered “numerous bruises and abrasions all
over [his] body,” and Steven’s son sustained a broken finger. (PSI, p.22.)
The state charged Barry with robbery, burglary, battery, and malicious injury to property.
(R., pp.45-46.) Pursuant to a plea agreement, Barry pled guilty to burglary and the state agreed
to recommend a withheld judgment with “no additional jail” time; however, Barry subsequently
failed to appear for sentencing and, as a result, the state was no longer bound by the plea
agreement. (R., pp.53-55, 69.) On April 21, 2016, the district court imposed a unified sentence
of five years, with two years fixed. (R., pp.78-83.) On August 18, 2016 – 119 days after
judgment was entered – Barry filed a Rule 35 motion for a reduction of sentence, which was not
supported by any argument or information, but merely requested a hearing “in order to present
oral argument and/or testimony”; he did not present any basis or justification for the request.
(R., pp.84-85.) Nevertheless, a hearing on the motion was set for October 3, 2016. (R., p.6.)
That hearing, however, was vacated (for reasons not indicated in the record) and rescheduled for
November 10, 2016. (R., p.6.)
At the November 10, 2016 hearing, Barry’s counsel requested a continuance because he
had been unable to speak with mental health court staff. (R., p.90.) The district court granted
the request and continued the hearing to December 5, 2016. (R., p.90.)
At the December 5, 2016 hearing, Barry’s counsel again requested a continuance –
against Barry’s wishes – because Barry’s paperwork had still not been reviewed by mental health
court staff. (Tr., p.3, L.18 – p.4, L.1.) The district court denied the request for a continuance.
(Tr., p.5, Ls.6-10.) Prison staff subsequently advised that Barry was not available to participate
telephonically at that time, after which Barry’s counsel renewed the request for a continuance.
(Tr., p.6, Ls.23-25; p.7, Ls.9-15.) The court again denied the request, but allowed Barry’s
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counsel to make an offer of proof as to what Barry’s testimony would have been. (Tr., p.7,
Ls.21-25.) After hearing argument, the district court denied Barry’s Rule 35 motion. (Tr., p.22,
Ls.9-10; R., pp.93-94.) Barry filed a notice of appeal timely from the district court’s order
denying his Rule 35 motion. (R., pp.97-100.)
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ISSUES
Barry states the issues on appeal as:
1.

Whether the district court abused its discretion by denying Mr. Barry’s
motion for a continuance to await the results of his mental health court
screening.

2.

Whether the district court abused its discretion by denying Mr. Barry’s
Rule 35 motion for leniency.

(Appellant’s brief, p.5.)
The state rephrases the issues as:
1.

Has Barry failed to show the district court abused its discretion by denying his attorney’s
motion for a third continuance of the hearing on Barry’s Rule 35 motion?

2.

Has Barry failed to show the district court abused its discretion by denying his Rule 35
motion for reduction of sentence?
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I.
Barry Has Failed To Show That The District Court Abused Its Discretion By Denying Counsel’s
Motion For A Third Continuance Of The Rule 35 Hearing
A.

Introduction
Barry argues that the district court abused its discretion by denying his motion to

continue the hearing on his Rule 35 motion “to await the results of his mental health court
screening” in light of his claims that the continuance “would not have unreasonably delayed the
ruling on [his] Rule 35 motion” and that the denial of the continuance “prejudiced [his]
substantive rights” because he was not given a “meaningful” opportunity to present the
“alternative sentencing option” of mental health court. (Appellant’s brief, pp.5-8.) Barry has
failed to establish an abuse of discretion.
B.

Standard Of Review
The decision to grant or deny a continuance rests within the sound discretion of the trial

court. State v. Nunez, 133 Idaho 13, 21, 981 P.2d 738, 746 (1999); State v. Hudson, 129 Idaho
478, 481, 927 P.2d 451, 454 (Ct. App. 1996). “Interposed in this discretion is the requirement
that a trial court must rule on a Rule 35 motion within a reasonable period of time or risk losing
jurisdiction of the matter.” State v. Matteson, 123 Idaho 622, 627, 851 P.2d 336, 341 (1993).
“Unless an appellant shows that his substantial rights have been prejudiced by reason of a denial
of his motion for continuance, appellate courts can only conclude that there was no abuse of
discretion.” Nunez, 133 Idaho at 21, 981 P.2d at 746 (citing State v. Laws, 94 Idaho 200, 203,
485 P.2d 144, 147 (1971)).
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C.

Barry Has Failed To Show That The District Court Abused Its Discretion By Denying
Counsel’s Motion For A Third Continuance Of The Rule 35 Hearing
Rule 35 provides both that a district court may reduce a sentence within 120 days after

judgment and that a motion for reduction may be made within 120 days after judgment. The
Idaho Supreme Court has held that a trial court has jurisdiction to rule on a Rule 35 motion
within a “reasonable time” after the expiration of the 120 days. State v. Chapman, 121 Idaho
351, 352, 825 P.2d 74, 75 (1992). If, however, the trial court fails to rule upon the motion
“within a reasonable time after the expiration of the 120-day period, the trial court loses
jurisdiction.” Id.
Barry’s second motion to continue the Rule 35 hearing was made 228 days after the entry
of judgment (109 days after his Rule 35 motion was filed) – nearly double the 120-day time
limit. The district court’s decision, almost eight months after the entry of judgment, to not
further delay ruling on Barry’s Rule 35 motion was not an abuse of discretion, as the court had
already had a “reasonable time” to rule on the motion and therefore risked losing jurisdiction.
The Idaho Supreme Court addressed a similar claim in State v. Matteson, supra.
Matteson sought to delay the trial court's ruling on his Rule 35 motion for a reduction of sentence
pending the preparation of a written psychiatric examination report. Matteson, 123 Idaho at 624,
851 P.2d at 338. The trial court initially delayed ruling on the Rule 35 motion to allow Matteson
the opportunity to submit the psychiatric report. Id. However, after Matteson moved for another
continuance because the report had not yet been submitted (approximately nine months after
judgment), the trial court denied the motion to continue and also denied Matteson’s Rule 35
motion without the benefit of the psychiatric report. Id. On appeal, the Idaho Supreme Court
held that the trial court properly exercised its discretion in refusing to further delay its ruling on
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Matteson's Rule 35 motion, finding that “[t]he trial court was not obligated to wait indefinitely
for Matteson to procure the report and risk losing jurisdiction.” Id. at 627, 851 P.2d at 341.
In this case, as in Matteson, the district court properly exercised its discretion in denying
Barry’s request to further delay its ruling on his Rule 35 motion to await the results of his mental
health court screening. As stated above, by the time the district court ruled on Barry’s Rule 35
motion, 228 days had elapsed since judgment (109 days since the motion was filed) and the
hearing on the Rule 35 motion had already been twice rescheduled, most recently to allow Barry
to procure the results of his mental health court screening. (R., p.78; Tr., p.22, Ls.9-10.)
Furthermore, in requesting a second continuance, Barry’s counsel acknowledged that Barry
wished to proceed without the benefit of his mental health court screening results, and that it was
“the second time [the victims had] shown up” for the Rule 35 hearing. (Tr., p.3, L.24 – p.4, L.9.)
Contrary to Barry’s appellate claim that the denial of his second motion to continue
“prejudiced his substantive rights” because he was not given a “meaningful” opportunity to
present the “alternative sentencing option” of mental health court, the district court was clearly
aware that mental health court was a sentencing option and that Barry was being screened for
mental health court. (Appellant’s brief, p.8; R., p.90; Tr., p.3, Ls.21-23.) The district court did
not need the results of Barry’s mental health court screening to meaningfully consider whether
probation with mental health court was an appropriate option. Had the district court determined
that mental health court was a viable alternative for Barry, it could have – as Barry’s counsel
requested – taken the Rule 35 motion under advisement until the screening results were
submitted, or placed Barry on probation with the condition that he apply to and successfully
complete mental health court. (Tr., p.11, Ls.3-7; p.14, Ls.8-11.) The court chose not to do so,
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stating that Barry “posed a certain threat to society and he needed to have that sentence imposed
to protect society” (Tr., p.21, L.23 – p.22, L.1), and:
The Court considered retaining jurisdiction at the time the sentence was imposed.
The Court also considered probation; however, given the severity of his actions,
given the complexity of the -- of Mr. Barry, the Court felt that the only way to
really protect society and deter him and others from engaging in this type of
activity was to impose the sentence that the Court did.
(Tr., p.22, Ls.1-8). Given the district court’s expressed reasoning, it is clear the court would
have reached the same decision whether or not Barry was accepted into mental health court. The
court meaningfully considered whether a sentence other than imprisonment was appropriate and
determined that Barry was not a suitable candidate for an alternative sentencing option. As such,
there was no need for the court to further delay ruling on Barry’s Rule 35 motion to await the
results of his mental health court screening. Barry has failed to show that the district court’s
decision, almost eight months after the entry of judgment, to deny Barry’s second motion to
continue the Rule 35 hearing was an abuse of discretion.
II.
Barry Has Failed To Show The District Court Abused Its Discretion In Denying His Rule 35
Motion For A Reduction Of Sentence
A.

Introduction
Barry argues that the district court abused its discretion by denying his Rule 35 motion

for a reduction of sentence in light of his status as a first-time felon, appropriate adjustment to
life in prison, qualification for minimum security housing, claim that his sentence does not
provide him access to treatment programs, and because there are community-based mental health
treatment programs available. (Appellant’s brief, pp.9-11.) Barry has failed to show an abuse of
discretion.
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B.

Standard Of Review
If a sentence is within applicable statutory limits, a motion for reduction of sentence

under Rule 35 is a plea for leniency, and this court reviews the denial of the motion for an abuse
of discretion. State v. Huffman, 144 Idaho 201, 203, 159 P.3d 838, 840 (2007).
C.

Barry Has Failed To Show The District Court Abused Its Discretion In Denying His Rule
35 Motion
To prevail on appeal from the denial of his Rule 35 motion, Barry must “show that [his]

sentence is excessive in light of new or additional information subsequently provided to the
district court in support of the Rule 35 motion.” Id. A review of the record shows Barry has
failed to satisfy his burden.
Barry did not appeal the judgment of conviction in this case, and he provided no new
information that demonstrated his sentence was excessive. The district court was aware, at the
time of sentencing, of Barry’s status as a first-time felon, that there are community-based
treatment programs available, that Barry had sold his house and was no longer neighbors with
the victims, and that he had employment available. (R., pp.74-75; PSI, pp.4-5, 8, 30, 32-33.)
Barry’s complaint about the conditions of his confinement – that his sentence does not provide
him access to treatment programs – is likewise not “new” information. It is well known that
prisoners are most often placed in treatment programs nearer to their date of parole eligibility,
and the availability of other treatment options does not render Barry’s sentence excessive. See
e.g., State v. Charboneau, 124 Idaho 497, 500, 861 P.2d 67, 70 (1993) (“While the appellant
points to the evidence in the record that he is capable of being rehabilitated … his possibility of
rehabilitation,

standing

alone,

is

not

enough

to

meet

his

burden

of

showing

unreasonableness…”); State v. Wargi, 119 Idaho 292, 294, 805 P.2d 498, 500 (Ct. App.1991)
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(“Sentence of confinement is not rendered unreasonable simply because it will arguably have a
negative effect on prisoner's rehabilitation.”) Further, “alleged deprivation of rehabilitative
treatment is an issue more properly framed for review either through a writ of habeas corpus or
under the Uniform Post-Conviction Procedure Act.” State v. Sommerfeld, 116 Idaho 518, 520,
777 P.2d 740, 742 (Ct. App. 1989) (affirming district court's denial of defendant's I.C.R. 35
motion).
With respect to Barry’s assertion that he adjusted appropriately to life in prison and
qualified for minimum security placement, this is – as the district court noted – no less than what
is expected of inmates committed to the Department of Correction. (Tr., p.21, Ls.14-19.)
Moreover, in State v. Cobler, 148 Idaho 769, 773, 229 P.3d 374, 378 (2010), the Idaho Supreme
Court held that where, as here, a defendant presented no other new information in support of his
Rule 35 motion, the district court did not abuse its discretion in giving little or no weight to the
defendant’s good behavior while in prison (a trial court's denial of defendant's motion for
reduction of sentence was not an abuse of discretion; defendant's prison behavior did not provide
valid grounds for a reduction in sentence). Barry’s acceptable conduct while incarcerated does
not outweigh the seriousness of the offense and the risk he poses to the community. In denying
Barry’s Rule 35 motion, the court adhered to its belief that the objective of protection of society
was the overriding factor in this case.

“When a court reasonably determines that other

sentencing objectives outweigh the goal of rehabilitation, the court does not abuse its discretion
in denying a motion for leniency under Rule 35.” State v. Moore, 131 Idaho 814, 825, 965 P.2d
174, 185 (1998). The district court explained that it “felt it was appropriate that Mr. Barry have a
fairly lengthy period of a fixed sentence to protect society yet still have an indeterminate
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sentence should he be able to do well within the Department of Corrections and he could be
released on parole.” (Tr., p.21, Ls.7-13.)
Barry presented no new information in support of his Rule 35 motion that demonstrated
that his sentence was excessive, particularly given the risk he presents to the community.
Having failed to make such a showing, he has failed to establish that the district court abused its
discretion by denying his Rule 35 motion for a reduction of sentence.
Conclusion
The state respectfully requests this Court to affirm the district court’s decision to deny
Barry’s second motion to continue the Rule 35 hearing and the district court’s order denying
Barry’s Rule 35 motion for a reduction of sentence.
DATED this 28th day of August, 2017.

_/s/ Lori A. Fleming___________
LORI A. FLEMING
Deputy Attorney General
VICTORIA RUTLEDGE
Paralegal

11

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I have this 28th day of August, 2017, served a true and correct
copy of the attached RESPONDENT’S BRIEF by emailing an electronic copy to:
BRIAN R. DICKSON
DEPUTY STATE APPELLATE PUBLIC DEFENDER
at the following email address: briefs@sapd.state.id.us.

_/s/ Lori A. Fleming____________
LORI A. FLEMING
Deputy Attorney General
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